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Abstract
This article examines the politics of urban refugees in
South Africa. It shows that despite South Africa’s adop-
tion of an encompassing rights-regarding legal framework
that has the potential to be inclusive towards asylum seek-
ers and refugees in the country and afford them basic hu-
man rights and protection, asylum seekers and refugees
nonetheless remain “internally excluded,” predominantly as
a result of practices adopted by a nationalist Department of
Home Affairs to implement refugee legislation and by the
UNHCR in its quest to prioritize the safeguarding of the in-
stitution of asylum. The article also shows how the adoption
of these practices has been facilitated by a construction of asy-
lum seekers and refugees as “bogus” claimants who have no
place in post-apartheid South Africa.
Résumé
Cet article examine la politique sur les réfugiés urbains
en Afrique du Sud. Il démontre que malgré l'adoption
par l'Afrique du Sud d’un cadre juridique englobant le
respect des droits, qui a le potentiel d’être inclusif envers
les demandeurs d'asile et les réfugiés dans le pays et de
leur assurer les droits fondamentaux et la protection, les
demandeurs d'asile et les réfugiés restent néanmoins des
« exclus internes », principalement en raison des prati-
ques adoptées dans l’implémentation de la législation
concernant les réfugiés par un Département des affaires
intérieures nationaliste, et par le HCR, dans sa quête de
privilégier la sauvegarde de l'institution du droit d'asile.
L'article démontre aussi comment l'adoption de ces prati-
ques a été facilitée par le fait de dépeindre les deman-
deurs d'asile et les réfugiés comme de « faux » deman-
deurs n'ayant pas leurs places dans une Afrique du Sud
post apartheid.
Introduction
In a society like ours which prides itself on its noble
sentiments, [the treatment of refugees] is shameful.
As South Africans we are  justifiably proud of our
country and of our democracy which has just
celebrated its tenth birthday. We are proud of those
policies which are enshrined in the Constitution, a
constitution which is unparalleled in Africa, and
indeed equals those of the most advanced countries
in the world in terms of liberality and
compassion…We subscribe to the principles
contained in international treaties…We claim to
enforce the laws put in place to protect the rights of
[refugees], and especially those pertaining to
children. Yet all these lofty ideals become hypocritical
nonsense if those policies and sentiments are not
translated into action by those who are put in
positions of power by the state to do exactly that; who
are paid to execute these admirable laws and yet,
because of apathy and lack of compassion, fail to do
so.
—Judge Anne Marie De Vos, 20041
Jude De Vos’s harsh words, directed at representativesfrom the South African Departments of Home Affairsand Social Development and the South African Police
Services for their failure to desist from continuing to detain
approximately one hundred unaccompanied foreign mi-
nors, both undocumented foreign children and asylum
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seeker/refugee children, at the Lindela Repatriation Centre,
encapsulate the challenges that asylum seekers and refugees
continue to face in their battle for inclusion in the post-
apartheid South African state despite the fact that South
Africa boasts a progressive legal framework within which the
rights of these urban-based asylum seekers and refugees can
be respected. However, as much as apathy and lack of com-
passion have come to characterize the treatment of asylum
seekers and refugees in South Africa, I will argue that this
sense of apathy and lack of compassion are in themselves the
effect of  a number of  practices adopted by  sectors  of a
nationalist post-apartheid South African state that, despite
its commitment to the respect of human rights, evidenced
through its adoption of an encompassing Constitution, its
accession to international refugee conventions, and its
adoption of a rights-regarding Refugees Act, nonetheless is
bent on prioritizing the needs of South Africans first and
deferring those of non-citizens such as asylum seekers and
refugees. While there is no denying the need for the post-apart-
heid state to produce a sense of unity in the country against an
apartheid history of division and dehumanization, the state’s
production of its citizens is ironically being facilitated by the
dehumanization of asylum seekers and refugees and their
recurrent portrayal as “bogus” claimants whose intent is to
deprive South Africans from enjoying the spoils of their
struggles and who should not be in South Africa in the first
place. As much as in a country like South Africa it is the
government, rather than the United Nations High Commis-
sioner on Refugees (UNHCR), which bears ultimate respon-
sibility for the well-being of asylum seekers and refugees in
the country, as illustrated by its willingness to accede to the
UN 1951 Conventions, its 1967 Protocol and the 1969 OAU
Convention, I will nonetheless argue that UNHCR’s prac-
tices to safeguard the institution of asylum in South Africa
against what it perceives to be either “bogus” claimants or
“irregular movers” finds an echo in nationalist practices by a
Department of Home Affairs that jointly work to “internally
exclude” asylum seekers and refugees, despite their legal pro-
tections, and further contribute to their dehumanization.
I rely on the use of the term “internal inclusion” to
highlight the dissonance that exists between the rights and
protections accorded to asylum seekers and refugees on
paper, embodied in South Africa’s Constitution, its Refu-
gees Act and the mandate of the UNHCR, and the practical
adoption and implementation of policies to give effect to
those rights and protections which, informed by nationalist
state sentiments and often tacitly supported by UNHCR,
serve to undermine the realization of those very same rights
and protections. To illustrate how asylum seekers and refu-
gees exist in a state of “internal exclusion” in South Africa,
in the first part of this article I provide some background to
the urban refugee situation. In the second part, I focus on
key government practices that serve to reproduce the inter-
nal exclusion of asylum seekers and refugees. In particular,
I show how nationalist practices have negatively influenced
the ability of asylum seekers and refugees to access refugee
reception offices and obtain documentation to secure their
stay in  the country, as well  as the “disabling” types of
documents that asylum seekers and refugees are issued and
with which they have to secure their survival in the face of
no state-provided assistance. The third part of this article
focuses on how the UNHCR’s policy on urban areas and its
quest to safeguard the institution of asylum serve to repro-
duce asylum seekers’ and refugees’ state of internal exclu-
sion.
Contextual Background to the South African
Refugee Situation
South Africa is characterized by a non-camp, urban refugee
situation where asylum seekers and refugees have freedom
of movement within the country. However, their settlement
in the country is generally confined to large urban centres
such as Johannesburg, Cape Town, Pretoria, Durban, and
Port Elizabeth, due to the fact that Refugee Reception Of-
fices, where asylum seekers and refugees have to renew their
permits, are located in these major centres. According to the
UNHCR, by the year 2000, South Africa had come to host
the largest single concentration of urban refugees and asy-
lum seekers in the southern African region,2 currently made
up of approximately 30,000 recognized refugees and
120,000 asylum seekers, predominantly from African coun-
tries.
The South African government’s policy towards asylum
seekers and refugees is guided by the Refugees Act of 1998,
which came into effect in April 2000 after the proclamation
of its accompanying regulations, and which is administered
by the Department of Home Affairs. In broad strokes, the
Refugees Act and its regulations envision the asylum proce-
dure to work as follows. Except in cases where the Minister
declares a group or category of persons to be refugees in
order to deal with a mass influx, each asylum application is
expected to be individually determined. Consequently, a
person who wants to apply for asylum needs to complete
“without delay” an application form with a Refugee Recep-
tion Officer (RRO) in person at one  of the established
refugee reception offices located inland in five major urban
areas, namely, Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town, Dur-
ban, and Port Elizabeth. At this time, the applicant is issued
with an asylum seeker permit in terms of Section 22 of the
Act, which must be renewed until the applicant is asked to
return to the refugee reception office to undergo a “non-
adversarial” interview with a Refugee Status Determination
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Officer (RSDO), who determines whether to grant or reject
refugee status.
Depending on the outcome of the application, the appli-
cant is granted refugee status and subsequently issued a
refugee permit in line with Section 24 of the Act, or is given
the opportunity to appeal the decision to the Refugee Ap-
peal Board or the Standing Committee, depending on the
grounds for rejection. If these two bodies uphold the deci-
sions of the RSDO, the applicant is able to seek judicial
review of the decisions by a high court, in line with Section
33 of the Constitution. Keeping these different permuta-
tions in mind, the regulations state that asylum applications
should be adjudicated or finalized by the Department of
Home Affairs “within 180 days of filing a completed asylum
application with a Refugee Reception Officer.”3
In line with South Africa’s Constitution, the Refugees Act
explicitly states that recognized refugees enjoy the rights
contained in its Bill of Rights, which, unlike many consti-
tutions in the world, not only embodies a bill of justiciable4
fundamental civil, political, cultural and socio-economic
rights, but also expressly extends most of these rights to
“everyone” (who lives in the country) rather than to “every
citizen.”5 Important amongst these rights are a person’s
right to equality and protection against unfair discrimina-
tion by the state; as well as the right to inherent human
dignity and to have it respected and protected. Linked to
these are a number of access rights which include: adequate
housing, health care services including emergency medical
treatment, sufficient food and water, social security and
social assistance, lawful administrative action and informa-
tion held by the state; as well as direct rights such as the right
to education and a number of rights to protect children.
Even though, except for the last two rights enumerated,
these rights are limited, in the sense that the state must take
reasonable legislative and other measures within its avail-
able resources, to ensure the progressive realization of each
of these rights, these rights nonetheless provide an impor-
tant safeguard to ensure a basic standard of living and the
enjoyment of basic human rights amongst everyone in the
country. In other words, despite its limitations and its
frequent invocation as the national soul of the country,6 the
content of the Constitution transcends narrow national
boundaries and contains the potential to create a more
humane society by asserting the primacy of human beings,
whether national or not, whether legally in the country or
not. In this regard, the Refugees Act has been hailed as one
of the more inclusive pieces of refugee legislation in the
Southern African region, as it enshrines freedom of move-
ment, as well as other fundamental civil, political, social,
and economic rights, in line with the Bill of Rights of South
Africa’s Constitution.7
However, even though the Constitution embodies this
humanist potential, the Constitution has become inserted
into a state discourse that asserts its centrality as a key
element to unite South Africans first as “equal citizens”
against a history of  relentless racial discrimination  and
massive socio-economic inequalities. In turn, giving effect
to the rights in the Constitution, and the production of
“equal” citizens, has in itself been circumscribed by a
macro-economic framework that tends to reproduce the
very same inequalities that the state has committed itself to
undo. The gap between rising expectations and actual im-
provements in the lives of the black majority population has
served to feed attempts by sectors of the state and society to
protect state resources for citizens by excluding foreign
others. As a result, its potential to produce a more inclusive
political community that incorporates asylum seekers and
refugees has been deferred. Instead, it has been up to inter-
ested political actors advocating for the rights of asylum
seekers and refugees to engage in ongoing struggles to
deterritorialize the Constitution, thereby giving substance
to its expressed commitment to rights for “everyone.”
By way of illustration, the inclusiveness of the Refugees
Act had to be fought for and, in my view, heavily influenced
by the active participation of civil society representatives in
the task team that drafted the Refugees Act. During this
drafting process, NGO representatives on the task team had
to lobby for the inclusion of refugee rights against recalci-
trant representatives from the Department of Home Affairs
who held that foreigners did not enjoy any rights in South
Africa.8 They also had to remind departmental repre-
sentatives that the Bill of Rights, including its socio-eco-
nomic rights, applied to “everyone” and not just citizens,
while refugees also enjoyed a number of rights as stipulated
by international law instruments. Similarly, NGO repre-
sentatives and UNHCR had to lobby for the inclusion of a
hearing as the first step in the determination process, the
independence of the status determination structures, the
upholding of minimum standards in the arrest and deten-
tion of asylum seekers and refugees, and the involvement
of civil society in the drafting process.9
One particular example of the Department of Home
Affairs’ attempt to circumscribe human rights and priori-
tize its citizens was its unsuccessful attempt to institute a
system of payment for asylum applications during the
drafting of the Refugees Act to distinguish between “real
refugees” and “bogus refugees” and recuperate costs, since
“[i]t does not help us as a nation to assist others whiles [sic]
our own backyard is still in a state of turmoil.”10 Under this
system, an amount of money would be refundable to those
declared to be “genuine” refugees, “but non-refundable to
all abusers of the system” who “would now suffer.”11 Asking
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applicants to pay served a dual purpose. It acted as a deter-
rent to protect the nation from further “infiltration” and
ensured that departmental resources remained focused
solely on citizens. In its drive to protect its citizens, the
Department was not concerned that the majority of appli-
cants, whether genuine or not, would not be able to afford
the application fee. Whereas the Constitution, as the high-
est  law  of  the  land, asserted the  primacy  of all human
beings, for the Department of Home Affairs it seemed that
some people were, and are, more human than others.
Having fended against these discriminatory incursions,
the task team ensured that, at least in law, the “refugee” was
to be extracted from the encompassing category of “illegal
immigrant.” In contrast to the political construction of
refugees as “illegal,” “invisible,” and “out of place” repro-
duced prior to the drafting of the Refugees Act, the adoption
of national refugee legislation had the potential to enable
the political construction of refugees as “legal,” “visible”
bearers of rights that had a “place” within the post-apart-
heid state, albeit different to, but constitutive of, that of
citizens. Unfortunately, however, this potential was seri-
ously circumscribed with the drafting of the refugee regu-
lations almost two years later to enable the practical
implementation of the Act.
In contrast to the fairly consultative process followed for
most of the drafting of the Refugees Act, the Department of
Home Affairs drafted the regulations with minimal public
consultation. The latter reflected Thabo Mbeki’s shift to-
wards a greater centralization of state power at Cabinet
level, once he replaced Nelson Mandela as president in
April 1999.12 This involved the co-option of political oppo-
nents, the elevation of the intelligence portfolio to a full
ministry, and an increased silencing of dissenting views.
Even though these moves drew heavy criticism from those
who believed that a large degree of power was “being
wielded largely  behind  closed doors”13 with  limited ac-
countability, the state defended these moves as a way to
improve coordination across different ministries over key
service delivery areas. The Refugee Regulations, reflective
of state attempts to assert control, defined the character of
the permits that would be issued to asylum seekers and
refugees, including a provision that prohibited asylum
seekers from working and studying during their first six
months in the country in the face of no state-provided
assistance, and introduced an exclusionary formal identity
document for recognized refugees that differed markedly
from  that issued to citizens. As I will argue, the state’s
adoption of these measures to give practical implementa-
tion to the Refugees Act, coupled to the historical tendency
of the Home  Affairs Department to neglect its Refugee
Affairs section and facilitate access to the asylum procedure,
largely set the stage for the reproduction of the state of
internal exclusion that asylum seekers and refugees have to
endure while in South Africa despite progressive legal pro-
tections.
The Battle for Access to Refugee Reception Offices
Physical access by asylum seekers and refugees to refugee
reception offices to lodge asylum applications and renew
their permits, particularly in Johannesburg where the largest
concentration of asylum seekers and refugees is located, has
been an ongoing problem since 1994. While it was expected
that these problems would be addressed as the Department
of Home Affairs devoted greater attention to refugee mat-
ters, this has hardly changed from the time prior to the
coming into force of the Refugees Act. In part, the ongoing
failure by the Department to take in increasing numbers of
asylum seekers and process their applications in a timely
fashion is linked to its tendency, over the last ten years, to
prioritize services to citizens.
The Department of Home Affairs is entrusted with both
the registration and provision of documents to South Afri-
cans through its Civic Services branch, and with control
over and regularization of population movements, includ-
ing refugees, through its Immigration branch. This Depart-
ment, which had historically been responsible for the
issuing of passes and implementation of influx control
measures against blacks, post-1994 was thrust into the
crucial role of ensuring that millions of newly redefined
citizens had documents14 that would allow them not only
to exercise the right to vote but also to entitle them to “enter
the struggle for resources,” a critical aspect of their demar-
cation as citizens.15 To shift its racist image and enable the
production of citizenship, this  Department devoted the
bulk of its limited human and financial resources to its Civic
Services branch, while treating Refugee Affairs as a residual
section, exemplified by its existence, until very recently, as
one of a number of subdirectorates within its Immigration
branch.
The Department’s desire to prioritize civic services and
its unwillingness to  allocate the necessary financial and
human resources to its Refugee Affairs section has meant
that a large number of newly arrived asylum seekers, who
have sought to follow the law and report to refugee affairs
offices to lodge their applications, are being forced to re-
main tenuously in the country without access to any form
of documentation for several months or in possession of
appointment letters issued by the Department which have
limited legal validity, do not count towards the 180 days
within which the Department is mandated to adjudicate an
application for asylum and are unrecognized by law en-
forcement authorities. Asylum seekers and refugees lacking
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documents or in possession of expired documents as a
result of being unable to gain access to refugee reception
offices remain subject to arrest, detention, and possible
refoulement under suspicion of being “illegal immigrants.”
Despite ongoing legal challenges by legal NGOs such as
Lawyers for Human Rights and the Legal Resources Centre
to force the Department to enable access and issue valid
documents to asylum applicants, the Department has not
exhibited a sense of urgency in processing new applicants,
who often sleep outside refugee offices for nights on end to
gain access, even if this constitutes a violation of its own,
and international, refugee law. Instead, as the Director of
Refugee Affairs recently argued: “Those people sleeping
outside—are they genuine asylum seekers? The system is
clogged up by illegal immigrants—those people know
South Africa, they know how to manipulate the system.”16
In other words, “those people” are not “genuine” anyway,
so there is no contradiction in their being possibly subject
to arrest and deportation. Neither is there any concern
within the Department that if asylum seekers and refugees
are not in possession of valid forms of documentation,
namely an asylum-seeker  or  a  refugee  permit, they  are
unable to access basic social services such as health, educa-
tion, and the limited forms of material assistance provided
by UNHCR. Thus, even after the introduction of the Refu-
gees Act, the state’s actions have actively served to reproduce
the equivalence between a refugee and an illegal immigrant
and internally exclude asylum seekers and refugees from
access to basic forms of protection.
Besides having an impact on access to the asylum proce-
dure, the Department’s neglect of refugee matters has also
meant that those who are lucky enough to gain access to
refugee reception offices and obtain asylum seeker permits
have to wait for years for their applications to be decided.
Over time, the Department has developed a backlog of
undecided applications that includes not only increasing
numbers of applicants who have legitimate asylum claims,
but also increasing numbers of individuals who, aware of
the length of time that it takes the Department to determine
an application for asylum, exploit the weaknesses in the
asylum system to gain access to, and remain in, South Africa
for other reasons. At present, the backlog of undecided
asylum applications stands in excess of 100,000, with some
of these applications dating as far back as 1998.17
Despite the Department’s engagement in a protracted
status determination process that both enables both the
presence of “abusers” in the asylum system and often drives
desperate asylum seekers and refugees to engage in corrupt
practices to secure access or documentation in the face of
perpetual delays, it has become more politically expedient
for the Department to portray asylum seekers as fraudsters
and abusers of the system who are responsible for the failure
of the asylum procedure than to admit that its own practices
are working to undermine the asylum procedure. In this
regard, whilst a prior Director General of the Department
recognized that the protracted application adjudication
process had rendered “the refugee system [as] the easy way
in,”18 he nonetheless continued to state, on different occa-
sions, that departmental officials often operate under “cor-
rupting influences”19 or a “corrupting pressure,”20 even
though he himself recognized that South Africa’s immigra-
tion service “is a joke.”21 These views continue to be es-
poused despite the fact that the ex-Deputy Director of
Refugee Affairs was fired for “her alleged failure to rein in
corrupt subordinates at the country’s five refugee reception
offices in Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town, Pretoria and
Port Elizabeth.”22 Similarly, the current Minister of Home
Affairs, Ms. N. Mapisa-Nqakula, has argued that “particu-
larly non-citizens appear to still have a high level of toler-
ance for practices that might result in opportunities for
corrupt practices to emerge.”23 Thus, it is the nation that is
painted as being under threat rather than the state taking
responsibility for adopting practices that enable the repro-
duction of the refugee as “bogus,” “corrupt,” and a “fraud-
ster” and therefore of their exclusion.
Provision of “Disabling” Documentation for Asylum
Seekers and Refugees
The Refugee Regulations prescribed the types of documents
that would be issued to asylum seekers and refugees. As
mentioned earlier, asylum seekers would be issued with
Section 22 asylum seeker permits while refugees would be
issued with Section 24 recognition of refugee status permits,
after undergoing an interview with an RSDO and being
declared or recognized as refugees. The Refugees Act and its
Regulations also indicated that refugees had the right to an
ID document but different to the South African one.
Section 22 Asylum Seeker Permit
The Section 22 asylum seeker permit is an A4 (297 by 210
mm.) flimsy piece of white paper with lettering in black ink,
which contains a black and white scanned picture of the
applicant, his or her personal details, a case or file number,
and a section on conditions applicable to the permit that
stipulates, amongst other things, the duration of the permit.
Due to the need to renew the permit either every month or
every three months, it cannot be laminated. Instead, as a
result of the multiple renewals and the requirement for
asylum seekers to carry these permits with them at all times,
this piece of paper is subject to multiple folds, tears, and




Until early 2004, when a protracted legal battle put an
end to it, the asylum seeker permit’s prescribed form had
imprinted on it the words “employment and study prohib-
ited” in bold, capital letters. The Department’s imposition
of this condition meant that during the 180 days or six-
month period accorded to the Department to adjudicate
asylum applications, asylum seekers would be able to nei-
ther work nor study. The Department argued that this was
necessary  not  only  to  deter further movement into the
country since “the rights that are accorded to applicants for
asylum are abused by persons who are not genuine refu-
gees,” but also because allowing asylum seekers to under-
take employment would automatically deprive citizens of
that opportunity.24 The prohibition might have been un-
derstandable if the state had taken it upon itself to pro-
vide for the basic needs of asylum seekers, in line with its
national and international obligations. However, as early
as 1997, the Home Affairs Minister had made it clear that
the UNHCR, and not the Department, was in the country
to provide for the needs of asylum seekers and refugees.
As he put it, “[t]here is really no problem about refugees
in this country…the UN High Commissioner for Refu-
gees…is here to look after their interests.”25 However, as a
later section will show, UNHCR is often more concerned
with protecting its own interests than those of its constitu-
ency.
Despite the fact that the Department of Home Affairs is
the lead government department entrusted with the imple-
mentation of the Refugees Act, the Department to this day
sees its obligations as being limited to the provision of
documentation to asylum seekers and refugees. Beyond
these functions, the well-being of asylum seekers and refu-
gees in terms of access to health, education, and social
assistance does not concern it. Instead, it is of the view that
either UNHCR or possibly other departments such as
Health, Education, and Social Development should be ap-
proached to deal with the integration of asylum seekers and
refugees into these services, particularly into state social
assistance and public housing programs that are currently
destined for citizens and permanent residents only. How-
ever,  it has  not seen the  need  to  provide  leadership  in
fostering interdepartmental co-operation to address these
problems.26 Thus in the absence of any state-provided as-
sistance to asylum seekers, the institution of the work and
study prohibition  left  asylum seekers without any  legal
means to ensure their survival and effectively served to
criminalize them and to blur the distinction between asy-
lum seeker and “illegal immigrant” as the former tried to
find forms of employment to survive, despite being prohib-
ited from doing so. Asylum seekers could be detained if they
contravened the conditions of their permits, could have
their permits withdrawn, and could be subject to detention,
a fine or imprisonment, or both.
Even though the prohibition was officially abolished in
early 2004, the Department continues to this day to use the
same forms for Section 22 permits that have already im-
printed in them the words “employment and work prohib-
ited,”27 seemingly out of the Department’s two-year long
inability to redesign the form.28 Instead, the currently
adopted practice by some officials at refugee reception
offices is to simply cross out such words and put their
initials next to them29 — a practice that simply fuels the
sentiment amongst employers and law-enforcement agen-
cies that asylum seekers are criminals who walk around
with altered documents, since anyone can grab a pen, cross
out the words, and initial next to them. It is, in turn, with
these permits—which have to be carried for years on
end—that the state claims to be fulfilling its obligations
towards the local integration of asylum seekers and that
asylum seekers must attempt to subsist in South African
society. Despite the permit’s shortcomings and its inade-
quacy in enabling asylum seekers to secure employment,
asylum seekers engage in a constant battle to possess it as,
at the very least, it provides some protection against arrest,
detention and possible deportation.
Section 24 Refugee Permit and Identity Document
Much like the Section 22 permit issued to asylum seekers,
the Section 24 permit is an A4 piece of white paper with black
lettering, which contains the logo of the Department of
Home Affairs, as well as a photograph, thumbprint, and
basic personal details of the applicant. Beyond the picture
and thumbprint, the permit neither contains any security
features nor is it laminated. Further, due to its size and the
requirement that refugees must carry documentation with
them at all times, this permit, as in the case of asylum seeker
permits, is subject to tears, folds, and fading. The permit also
fails to state explicitly that this permit allows refugees, by
law, to work and study, which poses ongoing problems for
refugees who try to use these permits to secure employment
in the face of employers who are unaware of what refugee
documents look like, let alone the rights that refugees have
during their stay in South Africa.
While the Refugees Act indicated that refugee IDs would
be “different,” the documents outlined in the Regulations
turned out to be significantly different from documents
issued to South Africans or permanent residents. South
African ID documents are green-covered booklets that have
a 13-digit bar-coded number and a number of pages,
whereas ID documents issued to refugees are maroon in
colour and do not have any pages inside. In a country where
the 13-digit bar-coded green South African identity docu-
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ment is the key to access public services and to integration,
the Department assumed that “abusers” of the system
would gain access to these valuable IDs and therefore to
valuable services seen to  be  destined for citizens.30 The
state’s issuing of maroon ID to refugees has served to
reinforce an important “internal exclusion,” by effectively
denying them access to publicly provided services and em-
ployment.31
Despite the Department’s encompassing  discourse of
solidarity and empathy, and its supposed attempts at “hu-
manising”32 and giving dignity to refugees by issuing them
with very different-looking documents, refugees generally
have seen these documents as further attempts by the state
to keep them as “outsiders.” Some, quite rightly, have noted
that these documents resemble the passes that used to be
issued to Africans under apartheid. As one refugee put it, if
indeed the Department aimed to give dignity to refugees
then “why give a document that is physically different to
those carried by South Africans?…It invokes the image of
pass documents—after all, the apartheid police did think it
may be giving dignity.”33 Similarly, other refugees have
pointed to the contradictions of this practice by stating that
“[o]fficially [the Department] want to integrate us, but now
we’re getting a red refugee book in contrast to the green
South African identity document…They want to label us as
different.”34
The issuing of identity documents markedly different
from those issued to South Africans and unknown amongst
administrators in most public and private institutions, in-
cluding employers, in practice has meant that refugees
continue to be further “dehumanised,” as the Department
seeks to delineate an “inside” of citizens that needs to be
protected from the outside refugee threat. In this regard,
even though some departmental officials have tried to argue
that there was “nothing sinister”35 in issuing a different-col-
oured document to refugees, the rationale behind it was
predominantly focused on control and differentiation be-
tween refugees and citizens rather than on producing an
“enabling” document for refugees.36 The Department has
made very few attempts to popularize these documents, or
any documents it issues to asylum seekers, and thus allow
asylum seekers and refugees to be integrated into South
African society.37
The character of the documentation issued to asylum
seekers as well as refugees, and particularly its distinctive-
ness in relation to documents issued to citizens and resi-
dents, militates  against their ability  not only to  sustain
themselves in the absence of any state-provided assistance,
but also to contribute their skills to a South African econ-
omy that is facing massive shortages as a result of decades
of inadequate apartheid education. In this regard, results
from the most comprehensive national survey conducted
with 1,500 African asylum seekers and refugees in the coun-
try in 2002 and 2003 showed that two-thirds of asylum
seekers and refugees interviewed nationally had at least
completed secondary education.38 In particular, almost
one-third had completed tertiary education, namely, un-
dergraduate or graduate degrees, but only 3 per cent man-
aged to obtain employment in skilled occupations after
their arrival in South Africa.39
In sum, despite the state’s formal (but always incom-
plete) compliance with both national and international law
in the issuing of different forms of documentation to asy-
lum seekers and refugees, its issuing of flimsy permits to
asylum seekers which, despite numerous court actions,
continue to deny them the right to work and study, coupled
to unjustifiable delays in the issuing of red, albeit formal,
identity documents to refugees which are unrecognizable
by most private and public institutions, including employ-
ers, has ensured that asylum seekers and refugees remain
internally excluded from access to the South African state
and kept at bay from posing a threat to the nation. More-
over, these practices by the Department have cumulatively
worked to reproduce a political construction of asylum
seekers and refugees as “criminals,” as they are often driven
to engage in extralegal activities to ensure their survival; as
“invisible” or “subhuman,” as they are denied their right to
have their basic human dignity respected; and as “out of
place,” as they are issued with documents that reinforce that
they are not from “here.”
Yet, despite the Department’s ongoing attempts to ex-
clude asylum seekers and refugees, these groups have con-
tinually shown their resilience by finding ways of
circumventing the numerous  obstacles enabled by state
practices in their quest for survival, through a reliance on
country or region-based refugee networks and participa-
tion in informal sector activities such as street trading and
car watching. This quest for increasing self-reliance to en-
sure their survival has not only been necessary to defend
against exclusionary state practices, but also against exclu-
sionary practices by the UNHCR, which, ironically, in the
eyes of many asylum seekers and refugees should be their
“protector” in South Africa.
The Contested Mandate of the UNHCR in South
Africa
Towards an Understanding of UNHCR’s Mandate in
Urban Areas
An understanding of UNHCR’s approach towards dealing
with an urban refugee situation such as that found in South
Africa must be cognizant of two main factors. Firstly, as an
organization set up by the United Nations, with the support
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of individual countries, UNHCR serves to reproduce the
international system of states premised on a congruence
between state, territory, and people. As an agency entrusted
to deal primarily with large population displacements, the
aim of the UNHCR is to ensure that disturbances to this
congruence are contained as much as possible and eventu-
ally eliminated through the pursuit of voluntary repatriation
upon the cessation of conflict, as the preferred and best
long-term solution.40 For the UNHCR (and the countries
that fund it), ensuring the success of this policy requires that
“individual refugees and groups remain as close as possible
to their country of origin…or at least in a culturally and/or
linguistically familiar environment.”41 Secondly, and to up-
hold these objectives, the general, and cost-effective, practice
of the UNHCR has been to set up camps, particularly where
conflicts have led to large population movements, situated
geographically close to such areas of conflict where large
numbers of refugees can be offered protection as a group, as
opposed to being treated on an individual basis.
However, the increased individual, rather than en masse,
refugee movements in the 1990s to urban areas away from
camps prompted UNHCR to devise a policy to address
these specific situations in a coherent way. The resultant
UNHCR policy on refugees in urban areas has been driven
by its desire to contain both movements to urban areas, and
thus further away from what UNHCR considers “the famil-
iar environment” of refugees, as well as the disproportion-
ate costs incurred by UNHCR as it tried to deal with those
in urban areas on an individual basis,42 while donors
“show[ed] little enthusiasm for long-term care and main-
tenance of urban cases.”43 Thus, from the start, it would
seem that driving forces for the urban policy have been
containment and the concomitant rationalization of finan-
cial resources balanced against a commitment to ensure the
protection of refugees, regardless of location.
This tendency to regard camp-based situations as the
norm against which to address the needs of refugees is
exemplified by the UNHCR’s definition of urban caseloads
as being derivative from camp-based caseloads. Assuming
that the majority of refugees should be cared for in nearby
camps, UNHCR envisions that only a minority should be
allowed to move to urban areas in another country where
usually there are no camps—or within the same country
where a camp is located—only on the basis of compelling
reasons, such as protection or security problems in camps
or settlements, as well as family reunification. If such com-
pelling reasons do not exist, then those who move to urban
areas in other countries should be regarded as “irregular”
movers.44 As defined by both the December 1997 UNHCR
urban refugee policy and UNHCR Excom Conclusion No.
58 (1989), “irregular movers” are refugees or asylum seek-
ers who  move, without the consent of  authorities con-
cerned and therefore irregularly, from a country where they
had found protection to another country. “Irregular mov-
ers” are often portrayed as individuals who, despite having
valid asylum claims, engage in “asylum shopping” in search
of better economic opportunities rather than protection,
since UNHCR’s assumption is that protection has already
been provided in the first country of asylum, usually
through camps or rural settlements, even if very often this
is not the case. To re-establish its desire for order, UNHCR
policies recommend that “irregular movers” should be re-
turned, where feasible, to their first country of asylum. As
will be discussed further on, since often this is not possible,
UNHCR’s assistance policy is aimed to discourage further
“irregular” movement to urban areas.
Protection and Assistance to Asylum Seekers and Refugees
in Urban Areas
Regardless of whether asylum seekers  and refugees  find
themselves in urban areas as a result of regular or irregular
movement, UNHCR’s December 1997 policy states clearly
that its “over-riding priority remains to ensure protection,
and in particular, non-refoulement and treatment in ac-
cordance with recognized basic human standards.”45 In this
regard, in urban settings where usually no camps exist, and
until durable solutions such as voluntary repatriation or
resettlement can be exercised, UNHCR is mandated to pur-
sue the local integration of asylum seekers and refugees as
an alternative third durable solution, premised on two as-
sumptions, namely,  “state  obligation  for protection  and
assistance” and “refugee self-reliance.”46 Unlike in many
camp-based situations where the UNHCR is the sole
provider for the needs of refugees in the absence of a well-
functioning state, in urban-based situations, and particu-
larly those where states have become signatories to refugee
conventions, UNHCR expects that states will exercise their
responsibilities to asylum seekers and refugees. To facilitate
this, UNHCR’s protection objectives enjoin it to engage in
“strenuous and continuing interventions…with host gov-
ernments…to encourage them to grant recognized refugees
access to employment/the labour market; national hospitals,
schools and other social services (at rates equivalent to those
paid by nationals); and, the naturalisation process.”47
To fill the gap that might exist until states take up their
obligations to asylum seekers and refugees in urban areas,
the December 1997 urban refugee policy indicates that,
under certain circumstances, UNHCR should provide ma-
terial assistance that is time-limited, “that encourages self-
reliance and does not foster long-term dependency.”48
However, it absolves the UNHCR from the provision of
assistance to “irregular movers,” by arguing that UNHCR
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“does not have an obligation to provide assistance to refu-
gees after irregular movement on the same basis as it would
had there been no irregular movement.”49 The only excep-
tions are cases where life-saving assistance is not available
from other sources or where the lack of UNHCR assistance
would compromise its protection objectives. Besides lim-
ited emergency assistance, the policy states that UNHCR
should provide  solution-oriented assistance to promote
self-reliance, amongst recognized refugees, “in a manner that
will depend on local circumstances.”50
Role of UNHCR and Implementation of Its Policy on
Refugees in Urban Areas in South Africa
The UNHCR in South Africa tends to operate within two
contradictory discourses. At an international and national
public level, the UNHCR in South Africa projects an image
of caring for asylum seekers and refugees, as per its mandate.
However, lurking below UNHCR’s public face—and echo-
ing the practices of the Department of Home Affairs—lies a
discourse that represents asylum seekers and refugees in
South Africa negatively, as “chancers” and “bogus” asylum
claimants. This discourse emanates from a belief amongst
UNHCR staff in South Africa that a large proportion of
applicants who seek asylum in South Africa are applicants
whose cases are likely to be manifestly unfounded, abusive,
or fraudulent. To illustrate, comparing asylum seekers and
refugees present in South Africa to those found in other
countries, one UNHCR representative explained that “refu-
gees in Zambia are refugees, refugees in Zimbabwe are refu-
gees…[but] 80% of the people should not be here.”51 This
is echoed in the UNHCR’s 2004 global report for South
Africa, which states that “among the many pending applica-
tions, as many as 80 per cent originate from non-conflict
countries.”52 While it might be the case that upon undergo-
ing status determination with an RSDO, some or many of
the claims made by asylum seekers are indeed found to be
manifestly unfounded, this can only be known with cer-
tainty once the state undertakes this individual status deter-
mination process and the grounds upon which the claims
are made are thoroughly considered. This much, the
UNHCR recognizes; however, despite this acknow-
ledgement, it is nonetheless of the view that “you might have
the odd person who has a valid individual claim but those
are the exceptions in the vast majority of cases.”53 Added to
this, UNHCR holds, despite the absence of proof to corrobo-
rate this, that the large majority of the remaining 20 per cent
of asylum applicants who have “genuine” or founded asy-
lum claims are nonetheless “irregular movers.”54 Thus,
whether asylum applicants have genuine claims or not, for
the UNHCR they tend to be deviant and a close relative to
“illegal immigrants,” either because their claims are pre-
sumed to be “manifestly unfounded” or, despite having
legitimate asylum claims, because they are “irregular” mov-
ers. By classifying those in South Africa who might have valid
claims predominantly as irregular movers, UNHCR also
does not have an obligation to provide assistance, but may
do so to meet minimum standards.
This belief by UNHCR that, even after an individual
status determination process, only a few applicants would
be “bona fide” or “genuine” cases, serves to create a culture
of suspicion amongst  UNHCR staff  towards  all asylum
seekers and refugees in South Africa which converges with
that espoused by the Department of Home Affairs, even if
they are protecting different terrains. While the UNHCR
argues that “these people should not even be here!” as part
of UNHCR’s quest “to preserve the space that is refugee
protection,”55 the Department of Home Affairs does not
want “these people here” in the face of “growing expecta-
tions of our nationals.”56 As I have argued elsewhere, the
tendency to see a potential abuser lurking behind every
asylum seeker not only feeds a mentality within both gov-
ernment and UNHCR that asylum seekers and refugees
should be seen as “guilty until proven innocent” but also,
and in the process, helps to foster broader societal xeno-
phobic reactions towards asylum seekers and refugees, ir-
respective of the validity of their claims.57
UNHCR’s Interventions with the Department of
Home Affairs
While both UNHCR and the Department assert that there
is widespread “contamination” of the asylum procedure,
they have adopted different ways of trying to close the
loopholes in the system. For the state this has translated into
contested attempts to deter people from entry into the asy-
lum system in the first place as a way to protect its own
citizens. These  have included active  attempts to  impose
boundaries of exclusion not only at South Africa’s geo-
graphical borders to limit the initial movement of asylum
applicants into the territory, but also, and as shown earlier,
internal boundaries by preventing the entry of asylum ap-
plicants into refugee reception offices and by refusing to
issue asylum applicants with documentation (or  issuing
them with documentation that has made it as difficult as
possible for asylum seekers and refugees to subsist in the
country).
While UNHCR might privately agree with some of the
initiatives undertaken by the state to control access to the
asylum procedure in the first place,58 UNHCR, whose man-
date is to protect and advocate for the rights of asylum
seekers and refugees, cannot be seen publicly as condoning
the denial of any human being to apply for asylum. Instead,
UNHCR has sought to protect this institution of asylum by
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ensuring that the procedure adopted and implemented by
the South African state itself can act as a tight and effective
screening mechanism. In other words, while the state has
sought to exclude applicants before they enter the asylum
system, UNHCR has adopted practices to ensure that the
proper implementation of the Refugees Act can produce
these exclusions premised on the notion that a fast, effi-
cient, and credible system that can quickly process applica-
tions represents a good deterrent against abuse. This serves
to explain UNHCR’s targeting of a large part of its inter-
ventions with the South African state on the Department of
Home Affairs. These interventions, which have tended to
take place away from the public eye, have included: capacity
building and advice on status determination procedures
based on international “best practice,” through the ongoing
training of government officials on refugee law and protec-
tion; and provision of equipment, such as computers and
printers, as well as resources to expedite the issuance of
refugee identity documents and the asylum determination
procedure.59
However, the UNHCR has been less willing to take active
steps to raise concerns that might have a direct impact on
the lives of asylum seekers and refugees. For instance, the
UNHCR has been slow to intervene in raising problems of
access to the refugee reception offices.60 To date, it has also
not prioritized working with the Department to initiate a
public information campaign to make employers, banks,
and government institutions aware of the right of asylum
seekers and refugees to work, as well as of the types of
documentation that asylum seekers and refugees are being
issued, including the maroon refugee ID.
The perceived unwillingness of the UNHCR to play a
more active role in ensuring the protection of those it is
mandated to protect needs to be understood within
UNHCR’s  desire to safeguard the institution of asylum
against those who are not presumed to be “genuine” refu-
gees. Within this context, advocating for greater access of
asylum seekers to refugee reception offices and integration
of asylum seekers whose cases are still pending, before a
“proper” asylum determination procedure is in place,
could enable the further “contamination” of the asylum
determination procedure. So, as much as UNHCR works
with the Department of Home Affairs to protect the rights
of asylum seekers and refugees, the character of its inter-
ventions is selective and aligned with its desire to keep
“clean” the institution of asylum first.
While asylum seekers and refugees regularly highlight
the limited assistance and support that they receive from
the UNHCR, UNHCR assumes that if asylum seekers with
valid asylum claims made it all the way to South Africa,
regardless of the hardships that they might have endured,
it must mean that they are either self-reliant or must learn
to be so since they “chose” to come to this country.61 This
perception also reinforces the notion that “real” refugees
are the poor victims who stay behind in camps, whereas
those who exercise a sense of agency in trying to improve
their situation as refugees—as any human being would
want to do—are not. Equating urban-based refugees with
being self-reliant and with not being “real” refugees does
not allow for the possibility that “real” refugees who have
valid reasons to be in South Africa might need assistance
while they struggle to be self-reliant.
The inadequacy of confining UNHCR emergency assis-
tance to a period of three months when status determina-
tion can take years is compounded by a situation where
UNHCR provides extremely limited solution-oriented as-
sistance to recognized refugees, mainly in the form of lan-
guage courses and some vocational training. Thus a
situation exists in South Africa where, not only is emer-
gency assistance inadequate due to its time limitation and
strict criteria, but also UNHCR has not undertaken suffi-
cient action to provide solution-oriented forms of assis-
tance, as per the global urban refugee policy. Even though
UNHCR has played an important role in facilitating the
issuing of documents to refugees, it has neither taken steps
with the government to ensure  that  employers  become
aware and accept these documents, nor advocated for the
integration of refugees into employment. Further, despite
the claims in the urban refugee policy that UNHCR should
develop capacity to promote self-employment activities
amongst refugees, UNHCR has made limited inroads in
establishing contacts with key government departments to
explore the possibilities of incorporating refugees into mi-
cro-credit facilities, the setting up of small businesses, or
facilitating other avenues for self-employment and ena-
bling them to utilize their much-needed skills.62 As dis-
cussed earlier, its main focus has been on safeguarding the
institution of asylum first, to ensure that those who access
the asylum procedure and its protection are “real” refugees.
In the meantime, asylum seekers and refugees are becoming
self-reliant not because of, but in spite of, the activities
carried out by the UNHCR and the South African state.
Asylum seekers and refugees have managed to find ways of
taking charge of their own immediate destinies, by provid-
ing support and accommodation and by opening possible
employment opportunities to fellow asylum seekers and
refugees.
Conclusion
As asylum seekers, refugees, and organizations working with
them have struggled, through their day-to-day practices and
reliant on the inclusive framework of the Refugees Act and
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the Constitution, to reaffirm a political construction of refu-
gees as political actors with legal standing, with visible rights
that need to be respected and as persons entitled to have a
place in the new South Africa, the practices of UNHCR have
worked to undermine this construction as it continues to
represent refugees, echoing the nationalist-inspired prac-
tices of the Department of Home Affairs, as agentic “fraud-
sters” or “bogus claimants,” who have no place in South
Africa, for either their asylum claims are seen to be “mani-
festly unfounded” or they have exercised their agency and
have become “irregular movers.” While the UNHCR as the
“refugee protector” would likely deny its role in reproducing
a “culture of suspicion” towards asylum seekers and refugees
in its quest to protect the institution of asylum, this “culture
of suspicion” has come to find resonance amongst sectors of
the state, key amongst these the Department of Home Af-
fairs, which wants to limit the inclusion of asylum seekers
and refugees to a bare minimum  on behalf of its “new
citizens” and despite an encompassing legal framework that
explicitly affirms the human dignity of every person. As
much as UNHCR might claim that its interventions repre-
sent forms of “apolitical” advice to the South African gov-
ernment, the selective practices adopted by the UNHCR are
having a direct political impact on, and militating against,
the ability of asylum seekers and refugees to gain visibility as
political actors in the eyes of a Department of Home Affairs
that defiantly justifies its apathy and lack of compassion
against ongoing contestations by NGOs, asylum seekers, and
refugees. While in the short term it will be up to NGOs,
together with asylum seekers and refugees, and a progressive
judiciary to fight for the humane treatment of asylum seek-
ers and refugees in South Africa, in the longer term these
struggles will require linking up with broader societal strug-
gles affecting South Africa’s poor majority out of a realiza-
tion that the economic forms of exclusion between rich and
poor that we  currently face do  not distinguish between
citizens and non-citizens.
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